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In July 1960, John F. Kennedy received a letter from Africa congratulating 
him on winning the Democratic Party’s nomination for the upcoming American 
presidential election.  A plea for help accompanied the congratulation.  
“Everywhere there are more and more [unintelligible word] Communists!  Everywhere 
Western prestige has slipped.  So for heaven’s sake change the image of America 
before its too late!”1  The Democratic nominee had already established a 
reputation across Africa as a sympathetic supporter of African nationalism, who 
if elected would realign Washington’s priorities toward the continent.  Once in 
office, Kennedy indeed made changing the image of America in the Third World a 
top priority of his administration. 
John F. Kennedy was the first, perhaps only, American president to make a 
pointed effort to court African nationalism. He did so partly on moral grounds, 
but strategic considerations were far more important.  JFK believed Third World 
nationalism would become one of the most potent political forces in the second 
half of the 20th century.  In fact, he believed that the growth of Third World 
nationalism might one day tip the balance of power in the Cold War.  For this 
reason he made it a priority of his administration to attempt to influence the 
nationalists of the developing world into aligning with the United States in its 
global contest against the Soviet Union.  He used all means at his disposal – 
economic, cultural, personal – to appeal to the leaders of the developing world.  
Kennedy’s focus in this effort centered on Africa, and he set out to court the 
nationalists of that continent.2                 
Scholars such as Thomas Noer, Peter Schraeder, David Dickson, and Gabriel 
Kolko contend that nothing substantial changed in U.S. foreign policy towards 
Africa during Kennedy’s administration.3  They maintain that Kennedy’s pledge of 
                                                 
1 Hand written letter from Barbara Ward to John F. Kennedy, 16 July 1960.  President’s Office Files, Box 33 “Special Correspondence”,  
   Folder “Ward, Barbara 7/16/60-2/20/62”, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, MA (Hereafter referred to as JFKL). 
2 Kennedy tried to court Third World nationalists from both Latin America and Asia as well.  He seems to have focused more on Africa,  
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support for African nationalism during the 1960 Presidential campaign was little 
more than a shrewd political move in an effort to appeal to liberals and blacks – 
two groups that were unenthusiastic about his candidacy.  These detractors assert 
that African affairs never became more than a peripheral concern for Kennedy, due 
to the fact that his worldview was dominated by the importance of sustaining a 
cohesive NATO and winning the Cold War.4 
A closer look at Kennedy’s legacy shows that he changed United States 
foreign policy towards Africa in both rhetoric and substance.  Kennedy devoted 
more time and effort toward relations with Africa than any other American 
President.  His willingness to aid any African nation regardless of its political 
orientation clearly separates him from any other man who has occupied the Oval 
Office.  Unlike Truman and Eisenhower, Kennedy supported rather than stunted 
African independence.  Furthermore, in stark contrast to the later 
administrations of either Ford or Reagan, Kennedy was committed to arms 
limitation on the African continent in an attempt to keep the Cold War from 
getting “hot” in Africa.5 
Dickson is correct when he argues that Kennedy’s worldview caused him to 
obsess over winning the Cold War.  However, Kennedy’s drive to win the Cold War 
was in no way contradictory to his desire to support African nationalism.   In 
fact, he believed that courting African nationalism was essential for competing 
in the Cold War and that both goals could be pursued simultaneously.  He saw the 
Third World as the decisive battlefield of the Cold War, and criticized the 
leadership of Dwight D. Eisenhower for having ignored the “sleeping giant” of 
African nationalism.  The new President proclaimed: 
 
The great battleground for the defense and expansion of freedom today,  
is the whole southern half of the globe – Asia, Latin America, Africa,  
and the Middle East – the lands of the rising peoples.  Their revolution  
is the greatest in human history.  They seek an end to injustice,  
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4 Dickson, p. 303. 
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tyranny and exploitation.  More than an end, they seek a beginning.6 
 
One of the most significant differences in the manner in which Kennedy and 
Eisenhower fought the Cold War was that JFK perceived befriending Third World 
nationalism as a necessity, while Eisenhower thought it was desirable but was not 
willing to go out of his way to do so.  This is especially true in any instance 
when Eisenhower believed potential U.S.-Third World relations would cause a rift 
in his relations with NATO allies. 
Kennedy’s belief that the Cold War would be won or lost in the Third World 
was profoundly influenced by a speech made by Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev 
on January 6, 1961, only days before Kennedy took the presidential oath.  
Khrushchev said it was the “historical mission” of world Communism to assist 
“wars of national liberation” in an attempt to end colonialism:  
 
A remarkable phenomenon of our time is the awakening of the peoples  
of Africa…Communists are revolutionaries, and it would be unfortunate 
if they did not take advantage of new opportunities and did not look  
for new methods and forms that would best achieve the ends in view.7 
 
Kennedy took Khrushchev’s speech seriously, reading portions of it aloud during 
the first meeting of his National Security Council and distributing copies to his 
entire staff.  “It was a significant event in our lives,” Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara later remembered.8 
The State Department later concluded that Africa was “the greatest open 
field of maneuver in the world-wide competition between the [Communist] Bloc and 
the non-Communist world.”9  The President was firmly convinced that Africa had 
surpassed Asia as the most permeable battlefield in the East-West Cold War 
struggle. 
It is therefore impossible to separate Kennedy’s desire to win the Cold War 
from his desire to court African nationalism.  Even Peter Rodman, a well known 
                                                 
6 Kennedy quoted in Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965), pp. 529-30. 
7 For a translation and State Department reaction to Khrushchev’s speech see “Report on Moscow Conference of Representatives of  
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conservative scholar of the Cold War in the Third World, concludes that it is 
impractical “to separate the generous program for Africa from the hope that it 
would appeal to the continent’s peoples as a more attractive alternative to the 
Soviet and Chinese challenge to which Kennedy himself had so passionately called 
attention in the early months of 1961.”10 
Kennedy had first established a reputation of opposing Western colonialism 
and supporting African nationalist movements while representing the state of 
Massachusetts in the United States Senate from 1947-1960.  In 1957 he gave a 
controversial speech on the floor of the Senate denouncing the French war in 
Algeria, as well as the Eisenhower administration’s uncritical support of French 
colonialism.  Kennedy charged that by ignoring the aspirations of Africans to 
govern their own independent nations, the Republicans were pushing the peoples of 
the underdeveloped world into the hands of the Communists.  Kennedy declared that 
“the most powerful single force in the world today is neither Communism nor 
Capitalism, neither the H-bomb nor the guided missile – it is man’s eternal 
desire to be free and independent.”11 
Kennedy hypothesized that further French attempts to silence their colonies 
“eternal desires” for freedom would lead to the radicalization of African 
nationalist movements.  He feared that denying self-determination to nationalists 
would push Third World intellectuals towards Marxism, which would have the effect 
of turning nationalists into Communists.  For Kennedy, the challenge of dealing 
with European imperialism was “the single most important test of American foreign 
policy today.”12 
The New York Times called the speech “the most comprehensive and outspoken 
arraignment of Western policy toward Algeria yet presented by an American in 
public office.”13  As a result, Kennedy became the man for African diplomats to 
see in Washington.  Many commented on their satisfaction in reading the speech 
well as the impact that it had on young African intellectuals.
as 
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By 1958 Kennedy had become the chairman of the Senate’s Foreign Relations 
African subcommittee and continually pressed the White House with the importance 
of initiating contact with African nationalist leaders.  “Call it nationalism, 
call it anti-colonialism, call it what you will, the word is out and spreading 
like wildfire in nearly a thousand languages and dialects – that it is no longer 
necessary to remain forever in bondage.”15  “After all,” Kennedy mused, “it was in 
our schools that some of the most renowned African leaders learned…the virtues of 
representative government, widespread education, and economic opportunity.  These 
are the ideas and ideals that have caused a revolution.”16  President Eisenhower, 
however, showed little interest in cultivating relationships with African 
nationalists.  While Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev shook the hands of new 
African heads of state at the United Nations in 1960, the American President 
chose instead to go on a golfing vacation.17 
In order to maintain the unity of NATO, President Eisenhower allowed U.S. 
policy toward Africa to be determined in London, Paris, and Lisbon.  His African 
policy was little more than an extension of the Marshall Plan, predicated upon 
ensuring that African resources remained accessible to Western Europe’s recovery 
from World War II.18  Assistant Secretary of State Henry Byroade warned that, “a 
sudden break in economic relations [between Europe and Africa] might seriously 
injure the European economies upon which our Atlantic system depends.”19  
Throughout his Presidency Eisenhower remained committed to this policy despite 
the advice of the Chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, who 
observed that Africans were, “offended by this policy, and regard it as a new 
form of colonialism, and exploitation by the United States.”20  
Eisenhower, however, cared little about what Africans thought.  His National 
Security Council concluded that Africans were unprepared for independence since, 
“the African is still immature and unsophisticated.”21  Eisenhower was openly 
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hostile towards “premature independence” and referred to the 1960 arrival of 
independence in Africa as a “destructive hurricane.”22  In fact, in his memoirs a 
series of maps showing the evolution of African independence is titled “African 
Upheaval.”23     
Kennedy believed that Eisenhower’s refusal to support neither anti-
colonialism nor African neutralism was costing the United States popularity 
throughout the Third World – as well as the Cold War.  The young Senator thought 
it inevitable that Africans would eventually attain freedom from European 
control; the question was with which Cold War bloc these newly independent states 
would align.  Eisenhower’s indifference seemed to be pushing them towards the 
Soviet sphere.   
By 1960 it appeared to Kennedy as if the Soviet Union, fresh off winning the 
race to be first into outer space and bolstered by a perceived nuclear parity, 
was gaining ground in the hearts of the underdeveloped world.  The Soviets had 
invested billions of dollars to fund Third World projects such as the Aswan Dam 
in Egypt, steel mills in India, and significant military aid to the government of 
Indonesia and Algerian rebels.  The Cuban nationalist revolutionary, Fidel 
Castro, had turned to the Soviet camp as well.  Moreover, while Dwight Eisenhower 
labeled African independence a “destructive hurricane,” Soviet Premier Nikita 
Khrushchev called such national independence movements “sacred.”  It was becoming 
increasingly evident to the Third World that Moscow supported nationalism, while 
Washington merely supported anti-Communism. 
Kennedy asked Harris Wofford to help Theodore Sorensen (Kennedy’s chief aide 
and speechwriter) draft new foreign policy speeches incorporating the candidate’s 
view of the importance of the Third World, and downplaying the need for 
Washington to view the world through the eyes of its European allies.  Kennedy 
told Wofford: 
 
The key thing for the country is a new foreign policy that will break  
out of the confines of the cold war.  Then we can build a decent  
relationship with developing nations and begin to respond to their needs.   
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We can stop the vicious circle of the arms race and promote diversity and  
peaceful change within the Soviet bloc…The most likely alternatives [to  
Kennedy being nominated as the Democratic candidate] are [Lyndon] Johnson or  
[Stuart] Symington, but if either of them is nominated we might as well elect  
Dulles or Acheson; it would be the same cold-war foreign policy all over  
again.24   
 
In 1960, for the first (and probably last) time in history, Africa figured 
prominently in an American presidential election.  Kennedy repeatedly attacked 
the Eisenhower-Nixon administration’s record on Africa, making 479 references to 
the continent during his 1960 campaign speeches.25  Kennedy argued that: 
 
We have lost ground in Africa because we have neglected and ignored the  
needs and the aspirations of the African people – because we failed to  
foresee the emergence of Africa and ally ourselves with the causes of  
independence…26 
 
 On the campaign trail Kennedy repeatedly stressed the low number of 
scholarships Washington had awarded to black Africa, as well as the low number of 
Foreign Service personnel stationed there (less than in West Germany alone).  JFK 
criticized the Republican leadership for turning its back on the nationalist 
movements of the world who had typically been inspired by the American Revolution 
and its values.  “There are children in Africa named Thomas Jefferson, George 
Washington, and Abraham Lincoln.  There are none called Lenin or Trotsky or 
Stalin – or Nixon.”27 
Yet despite his record of support for Africa, some African leaders such as 
Egypt’s Gamal Abdul Nasser, had initially hoped that Kennedy’s opponent, Richard 
M. Nixon, would win the American presidency.  Nasser’s support stemmed from the 
fact that Nixon was Eisenhower’s Vice President during the Suez Crisis, and 
“Egypt could feel nothing but gratitude toward both men [Nixon and Eisenhower] 
for the position they took in 1956.”28  After he watched the first televised 
debate between the two candidates his opinion of the two men soon changed, 
                                                 
24 Kennedy quoted in Harris Wofford, Of Kennedys & Kings: Making Sense of the Sixties  (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,  
   1980), pp. 36-7. 
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however.  Nasser was impressed with the Democratic candidate’s apparent desire to 
understand the Third World.  From that point onward Nasser decided that it was in 
Egypt’s interest for Kennedy to win the election.29 
Additionally, Kennedy made a number of dramatic gestures to demonstrate his 
interest in Africa.  When the Eisenhower administration declined to do anything 
to help African students who had scholarships from American universities but 
could not afford their travel fares to the United States, Kennedy arranged for 
the Joseph Kennedy Foundation to pay for their trip.  When Guinea’s President 
Sékou Touré requested a meeting with the Democratic candidate, Kennedy rented a 
helicopter to fly the African leader to Disneyland where the two held a well-
publicized meeting. 
 Kennedy’s campaign speeches and actions had sent a message of hope to the 
Third World.  The Algerian Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) held a vigil 
during the morning of November 9, 1960 to listen to the returns of the United 
States presidential election.  There was cheering throughout the camp when John 
F. Kennedy had pulled ahead, but cursing when it appeared that Nixon might 
overtake him.30  When the final results of the election began to reach the rest of 
Africa, they were greeted with waves of exhilaration and optimism.  Kennedy’s 
narrow victory had provided Africans with the anticipation of a better future for 
their continent. 
 President Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt was filled with a renewed sense of 
hope that he would finally be able to come to a genuine understanding with 
Washington.31  Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah wrote to the American President-
elect expressing that he looked forward to “complete kinship” between the two 
heads of state.32  Senator Frank Church noticed a similar response from the masses 
while traveling through Africa a month after the election.  “Whenever our 
presence became known, eager crowds would gather to shout, ‘Kennedy, Kennedy’…For 
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the first time, our country was being identified, Arab and Black alike, with 
legitimate African aspirations.”33  It was clear: 
 
(F)rom the excitement that Ted Kennedy (who accompanied Church and other  
congressmen on the trip), although he was not yet a member of the Senate,  
elicited wherever we went, because he was known to be the new president’s brother.  
And besides, of course, he had the Kennedy appearance, and was easily identified.  
There was an excitement throughout Africa at the time about Kennedy and some 
understanding that he had shown more interest in African affairs than previous 
presidents.34 
 
Kennedy became the thirty-fifth President of the United States of America 
during an exciting and optimistic time in Africa.  The first wave of African 
independence had begun on March 6, 1957, when Kwame Nkrumah led Ghana away from 
its colonial past and to independence.  By the time of Kennedy’s inauguration on 
January 20, 1961, the dismantlement of the French colonial empire had resulted in 
the independence of an additional eighteen African states.  Kennedy’s sympathy 
for African nationalism, both as a Senator and on the 1960 campaign trail, had 
helped swell the African continent with hope that under his leadership the United 
States would be more responsive to its needs. 
After winning the election Kennedy wasted no time in fulfilling his campaign 
promise to pay more attention to Africa.  In December 1960, one month prior to 
taking office, Kennedy assigned a task force to study U.S. African policy.  The 
task force discarded the idea that Africa was still a dependent of Europe and an 
area of non-interest for America.  The task force report recognized African 
aspirations for independence, self-determination, economic development, and Cold 
War non-alignment – and suggested ways in which the United States could help 
facilitate these objectives.35  Clearly, this indicated that the administration 
intended to take a new and serious look at Africa. 
 The importance of Africa to Kennedy was vividly illustrated by the fact that 
his first State Department appointment was G. Mennen “Soapy” Williams as 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.  Williams was a long time 
advocate of civil rights in the United States, and shared with Kennedy a common 
                                                 
33 Frank Church, “Our Over Involvement in Africa,” Congressional Record, 17 February 1965, pp. 2869-71. 
34 Frank Church, recorded interview by Dennis J. O’Brien, 25 February 1969, John F. Kennedy Oral History Program, JFKL. 
35 Report to the Honorable John F. Kennedy by the Task Force on Africa, 31 December 1960.  John C. Thompson Papers, Box 1,  
   JFKL. 
 10
vision of what America’s role in Africa should be.  Kennedy thought highly enough 
of the former progressive Governor of Michigan, that before naming him to head 
the African Bureau he considered Williams for Secretary of State.  The selection 
indicated a new emphasis on the importance of African policy.  Kennedy described 
Williams’ post as “a position of responsibility second to none in the new 
administration.”36  It became obvious that during the Kennedy presidency the State 
Department’s Bureau of Western European Affairs would no longer determine U.S. 
policies towards Africa. 
 Other prominent Africanists received important positions within the 
administration.  Former Presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson was appointed 
United Nations Ambassador.  Chester Bowles became Undersecretary of State and 
later Kennedy’s Ambassador-at-large to the Third World.  Kennedy also made an 
attempt to place ambassadors in African capitals that embodied the spirit of his 
New Frontier.  The newly elected President replaced many Foreign Service 
bureaucrats and political appointees with young non-career professionals.37   
Unlike many of their predecessors, men like William Attwood in Guinea, John 
Badeau in Egypt, and Edmund Gullion in the Congo, had “been out in the world, 
spoke the necessary languages, were conversant with foreign affairs,” and held 
views that they “could articulate with conviction.”38  Kennedy’s African 
ambassadors understood the languages, cultures, and problems of their posts.  
These new ambassadors were well received by African heads of state, who respected 
their ability to speak the local language as well as their personal access to 
Kennedy.  
Even more important was the fact that these men actually wanted to serve in 
the countries to which they were assigned.  William Attwood recalled in his 
memoirs that prior to leaving for his assignment as the Ambassador to Guinea, a 
journalist jokingly told him, “You must have written some lousy speeches for Jack 
to be sent to that dump.”  In fact, Attwood had been offered a few “more 
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prestigious” posts – but turned them down and specifically asked to go to 
Conakry.39  Eisenhower’s representatives to Africa, as well as the majority of 
ambassadors from Communist states, too often thought of Africa as an undesirable 
“hardship” post.  Africans easily sensed this, and did not like it. 40  Attwood was 
typical of Kennedy’s New Frontier ambassadors.  They were men eager to accept the 
new and unknown challenge of fighting the Cold War in post-colonial Africa. 
With his ambassadors in place and building from the recommendations of his 
African task force, President Kennedy implemented a four-pronged approach to 
court African nationalism.  His policy was to oppose European colonialism, accept 
African non-alignment, initiate economic programs to help aid in Africa’s 
development, and launch personal diplomacy to build a working relationship 
between himself and the leaders of Africa’s independence movement.   
The Kennedy administration made a concerted effort to disengage itself from 
the African policies of its European allies.  Making a huge departure in U.S. 
foreign policy, the young President resolutely declared that America was on the 
side of those seeking independence in the Third World.  “Their revolution is the 
greatest in human history.  They seek an end to injustice, tyranny, and 
exploitation.”41 
Within a month of taking office, President Kennedy had met with the National 
Security Council to revise the operating procedures for U.S. policy toward 
Africa.  Kennedy argued that it was imperative for Washington to discard the 
Eisenhower policy of deferring U.S. African policy to its European allies.  On 
February 13 1961, Kennedy signed National Security Action Memorandum No. 16, 
which provided “flexibility for the United States to supplement Western support 
to newly-independent areas whenever such action constitutes a revision of State 
interest.”42  Writing to the President two days later, Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk noted that the new policy would allow the White House the elasticity to 
pursue its own African policy.43 
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Backed by Kennedy’s support, administration staffers were frank in their 
support of decolonization.  Shortly after taking office, G. Mennen Williams 
created a small controversy when he proclaimed “Africa for the Africans,” a 
vision for the continent in which Africans would control their own political 
destiny.  This statement created a furor amongst both the press and 
“Europeanists” within the administration and Congress.  President Kennedy, 
however, stood by his Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and 
responded in a March 1, 1961 press conference, “I do not know who else Africa 
should be for.”44 
This was not merely airy rhetoric, as early as the summer of 1961 the new 
administration began pressuring Portugal on self-determination for its African 
territories.45  Responding to Portugal’s suppression of a rebellion in Angola, the 
U.S. backed a United Nations resolution advocating Angolan self-determination.  
The administration further pressured the Portuguese by terminating commercial 
arms sales to Lisbon, reducing its military aid program to that country from $25 
million to $3 million, and authorizing the CIA to initiate modest financial 
support to Angolan nationalists.  Clearly the days of allowing a NATO ally a free 
hand in Africa had come to an end. 
The second element of Kennedy’s policy towards Africa was to accept African 
Cold War neutrality.  Kennedy was opposed to the famous John Foster Dulles 
principle, which held that any neutralism was a “transitional stage to 
Communism.”  JFK feared that ostracizing Third World nationals would only provide 
“an open invitation to the Soviet Union to exploit discontent and hunger” 
throughout the developing world.46  “To dismiss or denounce these men [Third World 
nationalists] for every foolish thing they said or did, to cut off our aid food 
shipments every time they aroused our displeasure,…would only play into the hands 
of the Communists.”47 
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Kennedy believed that “real” neutralism, which he defined as neutralism 
consisting of balanced criticism of both the United States and the Soviet Union, 
was acceptable.  “We shall not always expect to find them [non-aligned countries] 
supporting our view.  But we shall always hope to find them strongly supporting 
their own freedom.”48  Citing America’s own neutralist past as an example, he 
stated that a policy of neutrality made good sense for newly independent and 
underdeveloped nations who were engrossed with their own internal troubles.  “If 
neutrality is the result of a concentration on internal problems, raising the 
standard of living of the people and so forth, particularly in the underdeveloped 
countries, I would accept that.”49 
Kennedy’s pre-inauguration task force concluded that the “non-alignment of 
African states in the Cold War is in no sense detrimental to our interests.”50  In 
fact, the task force argued that Cold War non-alignment would work in America’s 
favor because the United States “welcomed diversity, but the Communists cannot.”51  
The new administration theorized that the United States could win the Cold War in 
Africa simply by preventing its newly independent nations from going Communist.   
A third aspect of Kennedy’s African policy was to assist in that continent’s 
development by raising the African standard of living through U.S. aid and trade.  
Kennedy was skeptical of sending military aid to Africa or demanding that African 
countries fight against Communism without first alleviating the continent’s 
economic misery.  The first step in aiding Africa, Kennedy proclaimed, was to 
“cure the social chaos in which Communism has always thrived.”52 
The President and his staff hypothesized that through modernization, African 
nations would grow into economic and political maturity.  Economic stability 
would lead to political stability, which in turn would prevent Communist 
subversion.  Kennedy stated the importance of U.S. aid to African development:  
 
If African progress falters because of a lack of capital and education,  
if these new states and emerging peoples turn bitter in their  
independence, then the reason will be that the Western powers, by  
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indifference or lack of imagination, have failed to see that it is their  
own future that is at stake.53 
 
The Peace Corps was the cornerstone of Kennedy’s Third World development 
plan.  The logic behind the creation of the Peace Corps was two fold; it provided 
grass roots humanitarian aid (on African terms) while at the same time acted as a 
counterweight to the work of Eastern Bloc professionals – doctors, engineers, 
teachers – who Kennedy saw as “missionaries for international Communism.”54 
 While the Peace Corps fell short in terms of improving African living 
standards, it became arguably the most successful foreign policy strategy for 
improving America’s image in the Third World.  Peace Corps monuments such as 
irrigation systems, water pumps, and higher crop yields won the United States 
respect and admiration amongst Africans and successfully won the Cold War 
propaganda campaign against Khrushchev’s ‘missionaries.’ 
 The fourth, but ultimately most important, facet of President Kennedy’s 
approach in dealing with Africa was his use of personal diplomacy with the 
leaders of that continent.  When Kennedy took office in January 1961 the United 
Nations General Assembly was in plenary session.  Leaders from across the world 
were in New York City and virtually all wanted to visit the new American 
President.  Kennedy made it clear to his staff that he wanted to meet with 
Africans.  “If African leaders want to meet me, good.  Invite them down here 
unofficially.”55 
  Many Africans came to visit Kennedy on that occasion, and they would 
continue to visit the White House at an unprecedented pace throughout Kennedy’s 
tenure.  Kennedy opened up his 1600 Pennsylvania mansion to receive eleven 
African leaders in 1961, ten in 1962, and another seven in 1963.56  With his 
natural charm, grace, and informality he was able to put his African guests at 
ease by conveying to them his profound sympathy for African nationalism.  He won 
the admiration of African leaders by attempting to see African problems not as an 
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ally of the European colonial powers, but as the Africans themselves saw their 
problems. 
Although Kennedy had little prior contact with either Africans or African 
Americans prior to assuming the presidency, American Civil Rights activist James 
Meredith believed that in personal terms, he was the first American president who 
was not a racist.57  Likewise, scholar Thomas Borstlemann concludes that the 
generational contrast between Kennedy and Eisenhower was most pronounced in the 
way in which they related to individuals with darker skin.58  This may account for 
why Kennedy was much more at ease in his personal relations with African 
nationalists than any of his predecessors had been.  This distinction in attitude 
and treatment was easily noticed and appreciated by Kennedy’s African guests. 
Further impressing his African guests was Kennedy’s remarkable knowledge of 
Africa.  He was well-versed in African history, could refer to African 
personalities and issues, cite statistics and facts, and discuss in detail the 
various members of a leader’s governmental cabinet.  G. Mennen Williams 
remembered introducing the President to African leaders: 
 
  [A]fter the two had shaken hands and talked together a few minutes,  
seeing him walk to a globe in the corner of the office, twirl it, and 
haltingly put his finger on that leader’s country.  (Alternatively, I  
imagine that one or two African leaders or ambassadors may well have  
asked him with corresponding uncertainty, “Where is Massachusetts?”)   
This unaffected, ingenuous approach impressed Africans deeply.59 
 
This led some Africans to say after their meeting with Kennedy that the 
“American President knew more about their countries than they did themselves.”60  
After each White House meeting the visiting dignitary was brought upstairs to the 
Kennedy family’s private quarters and introduced to the President’s wife and 
children – an action that deeply touched Kennedy’s foreign visitors.61  Somali 
Prime Minister Abdirashid Ali Shermarke later remembered that Kennedy possessed a 
unique ability “to make himself a friend – immediately.”  “I had an unlimited 
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respect for the man, an unlimited respect for the man, beyond any doubt,” 
Shermarke said of his meeting with the American President.62 
The National Security Council recognized how much Africans appreciated the 
attention Kennedy gave them and concluded that America’s most important asset in 
dealing with African nationalists was, “the President’s status and personal 
relations” with African leaders, “on which we can draw heavily.”63  Administration 
staff member Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. remembered Kennedy’s warm relationship with 
African leaders: 
 
One after another, they left his presence with admiration for his  
“sensibility”, pride in what they now felt to be a special relationship,  
a conviction that Kennedy’s America, even if it could not do everything  
at once, was basically with them, and, most of all, a fascination with  
Kennedy himself.64 
 
Kennedy’s personal diplomacy was further supplemented by the efforts of G. 
Mennen Williams.  The head of the State Department’s African Bureau made several 
trips to Africa meeting with Africa’s leaders and serving as Kennedy’s personal 
representative.65  Williams and his wife traveled through Africa with the same 
vigor they showed in campaigning through Michigan.  The couple: 
 
…toured Africa as they had toured every county in Michigan.  No African 
nation was too small or politically insignificant for them, just as no 
Michigan town or county had been too small for the governor to visit.   
During the 1960s, Africa was changing rapidly and gaining the world’s  
attention.  Mennen and Nancy made many friends there on behalf of the  
United States.66 
 
Through his personal contacts with African leaders, Williams was able to “correct 
the views of U.S. African policy and thereby increase good will toward the U.S.”67 
 In his first year in office Kennedy more than doubled U.S. economic aid to 
Africa, expanded the U.S. diplomatic presence on the continent, made a deliberate 
effort to meet with African dignitaries, and launched new American foreign policy 
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initiatives.  All of these actions were undertook in an attempt to court African 
nationalism. 
 Throughout his term in office Kennedy continued this policy of courting 
African nationalism.  Prior to his inauguration the Eisenhower administration had 
already written off countries such as Guinea, Egypt, and Ghana as hopelessly lost 
to the Soviet orbit.  But by late 1962 Kwame Nkrumah and Gamal Abdul Nasser felt 
that Kennedy was the only western leader that they could trust.  Guinea’s Sékou 
Touré referred to Kennedy as his “best friend in the outside world” and said that 
the, “Guinean people now regard America as their best friend.”68  In Algeria, a 
country whose independence from France Eisenhower had tried to prevent, Kennedy 
had attained an almost folk hero stature for the way in which he had supported 
Algerian self-determination.  Ben Bella and the rest of the Algerian government 
could not help but be eternally grateful for Kennedy’s 1957 stand in support of 
their cause.  These were not isolated incidents, for such success stories were 
replicated all across the African continent, at great benefit to U.S. foreign 
policy.69 
John F. Kennedy saw Africa as an arena of considerable Cold War rivalry in 
which vigorous American involvement was essential.  The courting of Africa’s 
nationalist leaders was one of the key foreign policy initiatives of his 
administration.  Although the recurring intrusion of Cold War crises in such 
places as Berlin, Cuba, and Vietnam hampered his activism, he still managed to 
successfully realign American diplomacy towards Africa to accommodate the needs 
and aspirations of the leaders of that continent. 
The arguments made by Noer and Kolko that Kennedy’s African policy did not 
differ much from the policies of previous administrations simply do not hold 
true.70  Such assessments ignore the numerous changes he made in U.S. policy 
towards Africa.  Kennedy aide Theodore Sorensen wrote that Kennedy “succeeded 
beyond his own expectations in dispelling the notion that the United States was 
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unconcerned, conservative, and committed to the status quo.”71  During the Kennedy 
Presidency, the United States was for the first time viewed as being sympathetic 
to the aspirations of Third World nationalism.  In Africa, Kennedy became well 
respected for his aggressive efforts to find common ground with popular Pan-
Africanist leaders like Sékou Touré, Gamal Abdul Nasser, and Kwame Nkrumah.  
Despite the reservations of both his NATO allies and domestic political 
opponents, Kennedy wholeheartedly courted these ‘radical’ African leaders.  He 
did so because he felt that it was not only the right thing to do, but also in 
his country’s national interest.  
Senator Frank Church proclaimed that Kennedy was “the first American 
president to take a personal interest in African affairs.  He understood the 
importance of the collapse of colonialism on that continent, the emergence of the 
independent governments, and the need for the United States to establish good 
relations with these governments.”72  Kennedy’s Ambassador to Guinea wrote: 
 
As for African policy during the Kennedy Administration, the main changes 
were that we began to talk to Africans about Africa as Americans and not as  
junior partners of France and England.  Also we became less suspicious of  
nonalignment.  So far as Africans were concerned, these changes did add up  
to a new policy.73 
 
Africans sensed a genuine sincerity in Kennedy’s sympathy for their cause.  
For Africans it was JFK’s words that spoke louder than his actions.  Senegalese 
President Léopold Sédar Senghor said that after Kennedy’s 1957 speech on Algeria 
there was no doubt in Africans’ minds where the future American President’s 
sympathies lie.74  Africans “considered that Mr. Kennedy’s political attitudes 
were even more important than his efforts to aid their economies.”75  According to 
Senghor, “African chiefs of state had a feeling of great esteem, I can even say, 
great admiration, for President Kennedy.”76  Julius Nyerere, Ahmed Ben Bella, 
Kwame Nkrumah, and others understood that at times global Cold War considerations 
and the democratic nature of the American political system prevented Kennedy from 
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doing as much for their continent as he would have liked to.  Nonetheless, 
Africans were touched that a Western leader would show concern for their plight, 
and were overcome with grief after learning of the American President’s 
assassination. 
The news of Kennedy’s assassination spread rapidly through Africa – from 
Algiers to Dar es Salaam, Cairo to Accra, and even in the most distant and 
isolated villages, Africans mourned.  In Nairobi, Kenya for example, six thousand 
people packed a cathedral for the American President’s memorial service.77  Kenyan 
leader Tom Mboya said that the news of Kennedy’s death was deeply felt in his 
country: 
[T]he shock that was registered in this country was particularly noticeable  
because it was the first time that the death of a foreigner, and a foreign  
head of State, had registered so sharply.  It was as though someone very close  
at home had died and people reacted spontaneously in practically every little town 
and village in this country…I saw very clearly that President Kennedy’s  
personality had penetrated deep in the villages quite remote from the normal  
political atmosphere of the country…[In Africa] President Kennedy offered much 
excitement and hope in the future.  [Africans] saw in him a young man who  
understood the modern world and the problems of the younger generation… Another  
thing is that people saw in President Kennedy, in Africa at any rate, a very 
enlightened approach insofar as the Cold War was concerned…[Kennedy] gave the  
world that much more hope.78 
 
Days after the tragic events that took place in Dallas, the British 
Ambassador to the Ivory Coast telegraphed London that Kennedy would soon join 
Patrice Lumumba as an African martyr.  The American President, he concluded, had 
“captured the imagination of the Africans both because of his youth and 
‘dynamism’ and because they regarded him as responsible for the policy of 
standing up to the (racism in the American) South.”  Her Majesty’s representative 
in Abidjan ended his dispatch by predicting that if Lyndon Johnson continued 
JFK’s policies towards Africa, “the President’s death may be found to have given 
quite a boost to the American effort in this part of the world.”79 
Sadly Johnson did not maintain JFK’s policy of courting African 
nationalists.  Yet despite the fact that American policy makers have neglected 
Africa for so long following his death, Africans still fondly remember the legacy 
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of John F. Kennedy.  Sargent Shriver wrote how common it was for him to walk into 
an African village hut, after his brother-in-law’s death, and find a picture of 
President Kennedy – torn from a newspaper and placed beside the family album or 
mementos.80  Visiting Ethiopia, Kenya, and Ghana in the late 1980s, Harris Wofford 
found “that in the homes of ordinary people no other American president or world 
leader had joined the faded photographs of John Kennedy.”81 
Streets, schools, and parks all across Africa were renamed in honor of the 
slain American President, and his likeness soon graced African currency and 
stamps.  Kennedy’s Ambassador to Guinea wrote: 
 
[T]he President, as I say, was very good at personal diplomacy, and I’m sure  
that had he had the chance, eventually, to go to Africa, he could have accomplished  
a great deal.  I’ve found out, after returning to Africa since his death, that  
the Kennedy legend is very great, and a lot of the good will for our policies is  
still due to what he said and did in those two-and-a-half years…For example, there  
are many people in Kenya named after him.  Even though he was never in Kenya, many  
people felt that he was the first American leader who ever really understood Africa.82 
 
 Since the end of the Cold War, the American foreign policy establishment has 
increasingly shown less desire to court the Third World.  In fact, contemporary 
U.S. foreign policy is very condescending towards the developing world.  
Washington may be making a mistake by seemingly dismissing the growing strength 
of anti-Americanism throughout the world.  The importance of courting Third World 
nationalism is as important today as Kennedy believed it to have been in the 
early 1960s.  Perhaps future American policy makers can learn a lesson from John 
F. Kennedy’s policy of courting African nationalism.  The goodwill that was 
created by his strategy of befriending nationalists has proven to be more 
effective and long lasting than trying to curry favor through the use of economic 
or military aid.  If Third World nationalists turn bitter against the “New World 
Order” currently being constructed by Washington, “then the reason will be that 
the Western powers, by indifference or lack of imagination, have failed to see 
that it is their own future that is at stake.”83 
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